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ELLA S. LAIRD, Respondent, v. T. W. MATHER, INC.
(a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Negligence-Duty Towards Business Invitees.-A store owner

owes to a business invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care
to· keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition or to give
warning of latent or concealed dangers of which it knows or
should know in the exercise of reasonable care.
[2] Id.-Questions of Law and F&ct-Ordi.na.ry Care.-What constitutes "ordinary care" under the facts is usually a question
for the jury, which must view the conduct as a whole in the
light of the circumstances.
[3] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.-In the
absence of legislatively or judicially declared standards,
whether or not the conduct of a party conformed to that of a
"reasonably prudent man," the standard usually applied, is a
question left to the jury's determination when different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
[4] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Defendant:
Evidence-SuJliciency.-In an action for injuries sustained by
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store,
whether defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably
safe condition was pl'operly left to the jury, and the jury
could reasonably conclude that by ending a handrail, which
started at the top of the stairway, short of the bottom step,
defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger on the
grounds that it could reasonably have been foreseen that the
customers, a large number of whom were elderly persons,
would assume that the handrail would continue the full length
of the stairway, that their attention would be distracted by the
display of wares offered for sale in the basement, that they
would be preoccupied with the possibility of making purchases,
and that they would rely on the handrail to help them safely
to the basement.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 108 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 131 et seq.
McR:. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 76; [2, 3] Negligence,
§150; [4] Negligence, §§141, 161; [5,6] Negligence, §44; [7]
Negligence, § 147; [8] Negligence, § 43; [9, 10] Witnesses, § 136;
[l1J Evidence, §§ 156(3), 156(4); [12] Evidence, § 156(4); [13]
l~yidence, § 99; [14] Negligence, § 191; [15] Negligence, § 209;
(16] Negligence, § 246.
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[6] Id.-OontrlbutolT lfegligence-ExcuReI for Failure to Avoid
InjulT.-In lin R('lion for injuries sustained by II 7!l-yellr-old
department store patron who feU on the bottom step of "
stairway leading to the basement of the store, it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that plaintiff might have seen
the last step had she looked that she was contributively negligent as a matter of law; aU of the circumstances must be taken
into account, and where there is some reasonable excuse for
failure to observe an obvious danger the conduct may be
excused.
[6] Id.-OontributolT Negligence-Excuses for Fallure 1;0 Avoid
InjUlT.-Although a person may be charged, as a matter of
law, with knowledge that there are pitfalls to be avoided on n
public street, it is not necessarily negligent to fail to watch
for dangers in a business establishment when the ordinarily
prudent person would not in fact expect the condition where
it is, or where he is likely to have his attention distracted
as he approaches it.
[7] Id.-Evidence-ContributolT Negllgence.-In an action for
injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron
who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, it could not be said as a matter of law that
plaintiff did not use the degree of care that should have been
exercised by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances where the jury eould reasonably conclude that
plaintiff could safely assume that a handrail, which started at
the top of the stairway, would not terminate before the bottom
of the stairway was reached.
[8] Id.-OontrlbutolT Negligence-Care in DiscovelT and Avoidance of Danger.-Contributory negligence is not imputable to
a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which he had
no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who 'Was
deceived by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily
prudent person.
[9] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Matters Bearing on Credibnity.-Although the cross-examination of a witness should ordinarily be confined to matters that J1ave been testified to by the
witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to test
accuracy or credibility, and -the trial court is given a wide
discretion in controlling cross-examination affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert witness.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, §§ 210,220 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 174 et seq.
[9] See Oal.Jur., Witnesses, § 78; Am.Jur., Witnesses, I§ 625,
630.
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[10] Id.-Oro88-uaminatioD-Jrlatters Bearing 011 Oredibllit7.-lu·
An action for injuries Sl1stftined by A 79-year-old department
Ktore patron who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading
to the basement of the store, where defendant's witness
offered his expert opinion as to the safe eonstruction of the
stairway "anywhere in the world," the trial court did not err in
permitting plaintiff to inquire into the basis for this opinion
or to counter the effect of the witness' broad statement by I
attempting to show that it was not correct.
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Accidents or lnjuries.-Before
evidence of previous injuries may be admitted on the issue
of whether or not the eondition as it existed was in faet
dangerous, it must first be shown that the conditions under
which the alleged previous accident occurred were the same
or substantially similar to the one in question, but the strictness of this requirement is "much relaxed" when the purpose
of the offered evidence is to show notice.
[12] Id.-Relevaney-Other Accidents or lnjuries.-In an &etion
for injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron
who fell on the bottom step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, where it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove
not only that the stairway was dangerous but that defendant
knew or should have known that it was, testimony of a former
employee of defendant that he had been informed that someone
had previously slipped on the stairs and that extensions should
be installed on a handrail, which started at the top of the
stairway but stopped short of the bottom step, was relevant
and admissible, not to show that someone fell, but to show
defendant's knowledge of the dangerous condition of the
stairway. (Disapproving Thompson v. Buffum's Inc., 17 Cal.
App.2d 401, 62 P.2d 171, insofar as inconsistent.)
[13] Id.-Presumptions.-Disputable presumptions (eontained in
Code Civ. Proe., § 1963) are evidenee and as such ean be
weighed.
[14] Negligence-Instructions-Exercise of Oare-Presumptions.Although an instruction on the presumption of due eare may
properly be given under eertain eircumstances, an instruction
on the presumption should not be given when the party who
seeks to invoke it testifies concerning his conduct immediately
prior to or at the time in question.
[16] Id. -Instructions - Oontributory Negligence - Exercise of
Oare-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries sustained by
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, where
plaintiff testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the
time of her fall, there was no room for any presumption of
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'-------------------------------------------------due care, and it was error to instruct the jury on ncb preIIUlIlption.
[16] Id. - Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructiona-OontributoJ7
Negligence.-In an action for injuries sustained by a 79-yearold department store patron who fell on the bottom step of a
stairway leading to the basement of the store, the giving of an
erroneous instruction on the presumption of due care, after
plaintiff testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the
time of her fall, was prejudicial where from the evidence presented the jury could reasonably have drawn the inference
either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, the giving of the instruction added strength to plaintiff's contention that she was acting with due care for her own
safety and thus overemphasized her claim in the minds of the
jury, and defendant was thereby forced to overcome by a
preponderance of evidence, Dot only plaintiff's ease that she
was free from contributory negligence, but also the presumption that she was acting with due care.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying motion for judgment notwithatanding the verdict. John Gee Clark, Judge.
Reversed. ;
Action for damages for injuries sustained by patron of
store as result of fall on bottom step of stairway leading to
basement of store. Judgment for plaintitl reversed.
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker
for Appellant.
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine and James S. Cline for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-While descending the stairway to the basement of defendant's store, plaintitl, a 79-year-old woman
whose health and eyesight were good, fell on the bottom step
and suffered a broken hip. A' photograph of the stairway
taken from the basement (defendant's Exhibit B, reproduced
on next page) shows the stairway as it was on the day of
the accident except that in addition to the handrails there
was a rail on each side of the stairwell on the wings where
the brackets appear. The handrail terminated approximately
a step aud a half short of the full length of the stairway. III
this action for damages plaintiff testified that she used the
handrail for support, that when she reached the end of the
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handrail she assumed that she had reached the bottom of the
stairs, and that she then stepped forward and fell. At the
trial, which was held four years after the accident, she testified at one time that she could not remember where she was
looking when she fell and at another time that she was looking out into the lighted basement. Wares were on display in
the basement in front of the stairs. Plaintiff testified that
she did not recall looking at any particular display, but defendant's traffic manager testified that after the accident

)

Nov. 1958]

LAIRD

v. T. W.

MATHER, INC.

215

151 C.2d 210; 331 P.2d 6171

------_._------------------plaintiff statecl to him thllt shp hl'l(l hp{,TI lol)king at. the merchandise in front of lhl' stairway. 'rhf're was testimony that
at least 50 per cent of the customers visiting defendant's
department store were over 65-70 years of age, that defendant had notice of the condition of the stairway, and that extensions for the handrail had been ordered but had not been
installed by the _time of the accident. Two witnesses testified
for defendant that the stairway did not violate the Pasadena
Building Code and that it was constructed according to
"standard engineering practice."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for
$9,540.18. Motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict
and from the order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that the evidence was insuffi:cient to establish liability and that certain rulings on
:admission of evidence and instructions to the jury were preju·dicially erroneous.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidcnce to Support the V udlicf
[1] It is conceded that the plaintiff was a business invitee
at the time of the accident. Defendant was therefore obliged
· to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably
safe condition or to give warning of latent or concealed
dangers of which it knew or should have known in the exercise
· of reasonable care. (Blumberg v. M. ~ T. Inc., 34 Ca1.2d 226,
229 [209 P.2d 1] ; Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas, 4 Ca1.2d 511, 512
· [50 P.2d 801] ; see 2 Rest., Torts, § 343.) Defendant contends
that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should have been granted on the grounds that the evidence
discloses as a matter of law that it exercised the required
degree of care in the maintenance of its premises and that the
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety.
[2] What constitutes "ordinary care" under the facts
of any particular case is usually a qnestion for the jury, which
must view the conduct as a whole in the light of all the circumstances. [3] Thus, it is common practice for the jury
to determine the standard of conduct to be applied within
the compass of the broad rule that the prescribed conduct
111Ust conform to that of a "reasonably prudent man under
the circumstances." (See Peri v. Los Angelcs Junction Ry.
Co., 22 Ca1.2d 111, 120-121 [137 P.2d 441]; Clinkscales v.
Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72, 75-76 [136 P.2d 777].) In the absence
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of It>.gifllativeh· or jlldjd811~' dpl'lart>d standards, the question
whcthl'r or 1I0t t.he 1'0nduC't or a party ('onrormed t.o that of a
"reasonably prudent mall" is left to the jury's determination
when different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the
evidence. (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Ca1.2d 647, 656 [122
P.2d 576] ; Brandenburg v. Pacific Gas d- Elec. 00., 28 Cal.2d
282,285-286 [169 P.2d 909] ; McStay v. Oitizens Nat. T. ~ S.
Bank, 5 Cal.App.2d 595, 600 [43 P.2d 560].) [4] Applying
this rule we have concluded that the question whether or not
defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably safe
condition was properly left to the jury. Defendant's customers included a large number of elderly persons. The jury
could reasonably conclude that by ending the handrail short
of the bottom step of the stairway, defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger, on the grounds that it could
reasonably have been foreseen that the customers would assume that the handrail would continue the full length of the
stairway, that their attention would be distracted by the
display of wares offered for sale in the basement, that they
would be preoccupied with the possibility of making purchases,l and that they would rely on the handrail to help
them safely to the basement.
Defendant cites several decisions for the proposition that
it is not liable as a matter of law. In Holmes v. Moesser, 120
Cal.App.2d 612 [262 P.2d 27], the plaintiff fell on stairs that
did not have a handrail even though a statute required that
one be provided. In affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the
court held that the absence of a handrail is not actionable
'The trial eourt instructed the jury that: "You may eonaider the
fact that the attention of persons who visit public ator. ordiJlarily il
attracted by the diBplay of wares offered for .ale and may be more or
1e81 absorbed by the tranBaction which they have in mind. You may
eouider whether the defendant anticipated that fact with ordinary
eare in the exercise of the duty which I have ddned; also whether the
plaintiff did or did not ahare that ordinary experienee of .tore visitors,
and if .0, what effect that fact had upon her conduct in relation to
the cause of the accident!' Defendant contends that it waa prejudicial
error to ao instruct the jury, on the 1P'0und that the instruction i.
unaupported by the evidence. The eontention is without merit.
Although plaintiff did testify that .he eould not recall that her attention had boen distracted by any particular diBplay, there was evidence
that merchandise W&8 on display directly in frout of the stairway;
plaintiff testified at one time that slle was looking out into the lighted
basement; and the defendant's traffic manager testified that plaintiff
told him that just before she fell ahe was "looking at the nlerehandisc
out in the open in front of the stairwell!' The fact that there was
merchandise on display in the proximity of the .tairwell is relevant
to the issue of the foreseeability of accident. from the use of the
handrail.
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)l(\gligence when there is no showing that this absence caused
or contributed to the plaintiff's fall. In the present case there
is evidence that plaintiff's fall was caused by the fact that the
railing did not run the full length of the stairway. Marple v.
Manspeaker, 88 Cal.App. 682 [263 P. 1022]; Harpke v.
La""kershillt Estate.s, 103 Cal.App.2d 143 [229 P.2d 103] ; and
Darrach v. Trustees of B. F. County Medical Assn., 121
Cal.App.2d 3.62 [263 P.2d 469], are likewise not controlling,
for they hold only that no inference of negligence arises from
the mere proof of a fall on a stairway. In all these cases the
plaintiff's fall was left unexplained; there was no evidence
that the particular stairs were unsafe or dangerous, that the
defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition, or that the plaintiff fell because of any unsafe condition.
Defendant contends that the condition of the stairway was
obvious and that it has no duty to warn of dangers that the
ordinary person would perceive in the exercise of reasonable
care for his own safety. For this proposition it relies heavily
on Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas, 4 Ca1.2d 511 {50 P.2d 801]. In
that case, while walking along a public street with her attention fixed on a window display, plaintiff fell into a recess from
which a stairway led to the basement of defendant's store.
Affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the court held that the
plaintiff was contributively negligent as a matter of law:
"The evidence shows without conflict that the plaintiff heedlessly walked into an open stairway in broad daylight. She
was a pedestrian on a busy street, paying no attention whatever to where she was walking.... A person walking through
the busy streets of a large city is charged with the knowledge
that there are many open stairways leading to basements of
mercantile establishments. There is no duty to give any
warning in broad daylight of the presence of a stairway and
persons must use their eyes to protect themselves from such
obvious dangers. (Citations.) " (4: Ca1.2d at pp. 512-513.)
[6] Defendant contends that .in the present case plaintiff
could likewise have protected· ·herself "merely by using her
eyes. " But it does not follow from the fact that plaintiff
might have seen the last step had she looked that she was
contributively negligent as a matter of law. All of the circumstances must be taken into account, and where there is
some reasonable excuse for a failure to observe an obvious
danger tbe cOlldut't Diay be eXl'llsed. [6] Although a person
lllay be charged, as a matter of law, with the knowledge that
there are pitfalls to be avoided on a public street, it is not
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necessarily negligcnt to fail to watch for dangers in a business
establishment when the ordinarily prudent person would 110t
in fact expcct to find the condition wlH're it is, or where he is
likely to have his attcntion distracted as he approaellCs it.
(See Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1491-1493; Prosser,
Torts, 2d ed., 459-460.) There are many cases iuvolviug aecidents in mercantile establishments where the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence has been held to be a
question for the jury even though the plaintiff failed to
observe what may have been an obvious danger. For example,
in Walsh v. Maurice Mercantile 00., 20 Cal.App.2d 45 [66 '
P.2d 181], the plaintiff tripped and fell over a scale that protruded into the aisle of defendant's store. The court stated:
"Conceding that if the plaintiff had looked she might have
seen the scale, nevertheless in the circumstances she was reasonably justified in assuming that the aisle was unobstructed,
and her failure to sec it was not necessarily negligence. Different inferences might be drawn from the evidence ... the ques-'
tion was one for the jury." (See also Bl1l'1nbcrg v. M. &7 T.
Inc., 34 Ca1.2d 226 [209 P.2d 1] [clearly visible opening in rug
mat] ; Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647 [122 P.2d 576]
[projeetion extending over the end of a stairway] ; Rau v.
Redwood City Woman's Olub, 111 Cal.App.2d 546 [245 P.2d
12] [worn and slippery stairs] ; Locke v. Red River Lbr. 00.,
65 Ca1.App.2d 322 [150 P.2d 506] {plainly visible crack in
concrete floor].) [7] In the ,present case we cannot say
that as a matter of law plaintiff, did not use the degree of
care that should have been exercised by a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstanecs. The jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff could safely assume that the handrail would not terminate before the bottom of the stairway
was reached. [8] "Contributory negligence is not imputable to a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which
he had no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who
was deceived by appearanees calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person." (Brandenbut'g v. Pacific Gas &7 Elec.
00.,28 Ca1.2d 282, 287 [169 P.2d 909].) There was therefore
no error in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
II. Scope of Oross-Examination of Defendant's
Expert Witness
Thomas C. Shields, a cOllstructioll eugiueer ,prest'nted by
defendant as an expert witness, testified on direct examination
that in his opinion the stairway conformed to "standard
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engineering practice" in the eity of Pasadena. On crossexamination plaintiff's counsel asked whether he limited his
answers to standard engineering practice in Pasadena, to
which the witness replied "No," volunteering that: "That
would also be [true] anywhere in the world, so far as I am
concerned."
The witness was then asked, over objection,
whether the stairway would conform to proper practice in
"all of Los Angeles, " to which he replied, "Yes." On further
cross-examination counsel interrogated him on his familiarity
with the Los Angeles Building Code and the witness read
from the code certain provisions dealing with the requirement of handrails. Defendant contends that facts concerning
the building code were irrelevant to the present inquiry, that
they were not brought out on direct examination, and that it
was therefore improper to permit this course of cross-examination. Plaintiff contends that when the witness voluntarily
stated that in his expert opinion the stairway conformed to
standard engineering practice "everywhere in the world" including Los Angeles, plaintiff could test his credibility by
showing that this statement could not possibly be true.
[9] Although the cross-examination of a witness should
ordinarily be confined to matters that have been testified to by
the witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to
test accuracy or credibility (Newman v. Los Angeles Transit
Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 691 [262 P.2d 95]; Wigmore,
Evidence, § 1006 j McCormick, Evidence, § 22), and the trial
court is given a wide discretion in controlling cross-examination affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert
witness. (Laguna Salada, etc. School Dist. v. Pacific Developn~ent 00., 119 Cal.App.2d 470 [259 P.2d 498].)
[10] In
the present case defendant's witness offered his expert opinion
as to the safe construction of the stairway Hanywhere in the
world." The trial court did not err in permitting the plaintiff
to inquire into the basis for this opinion nor to counter the
effect of the witness's broad statement by attempting to show
that it was not correct. (Of. People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d
469,476 [190 P.2d 9].)
III. Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Injuries
Over objection by defendant, George Falk, a former employee of defendant, was permitted to testify that before the
aceident he had told Mr. Kalik, defendant's vice-president,
that: "we should do something ahout that rail because I had
heard from one of the employees-I don't remember who it
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;was-that someone bad almost fallen, and he said, •All right.
Go ahead, and get the extensions put on it.' " The trial court
instructed the jury that the conversation was received for the
limited purpose of showing that defendant had notice of the
condition of the stairway. Defendant claims that the court
erred, on the ground that there was no preliminary showing
that the alleged previous incident occurred under substantially
similar circumstances as the injury in the present case.
[11] Before evidence of previous injuries may be admitted
on the issue of whether or not the condition as it existed was
in fact a dangerous one, it must first be shown that the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred
were the same or substantially similar to the one in question.
(MartindaZe v. Afcki.!on, T. cf B.F. By. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d
400, 4:11 [201 P.2d 4:8]; see Wigmore, Evidence § 4:58;
McCormick, Evidence 351-352. The strictness of this
requirement of similarity of conditions is "much relaxed,"
however, when the purpose of the offered evidence is to show
notice, "since all that is required here is that the previous
injury should be such as to attract the defendant's attention
to the dangerous situation which resulted in the litigated
accident." (McOormick, Evidence 352; see also McCormick
v. Great Western Power Co., 214: Cal. 658, 665-666 [8 P.2d
14:5, 81 A.L.R. 678] ; (h'Zbert v. Pessin Grocery Co., 132 Cal.
App.2d 212, 217-221 [282 P.2dl4:8].) [11] In the present
ease it was incumbent upon plaintiff to prove not only that
the stairway was dangerous but that the defendant knew or
abould have known that it was. Kr. Falk's testimony was
offered solely to show such notice. The import of that testimony was that Mr. Kalik had been informed that someone
had slipped on the stairs and that extensions should be installed on the handrail. If believed, the testimony would
support a finding that defendant was aware that the handrail
presented a hazard to the users of the stairWay. It was therefore relevant and admissible, not to show that someone actually
fell, but to show defendant's knowledge of the dangerous
condition of the stairway. Insofar as Tko7'npson v. Buffum'.,
Inc., 17 Cal.App.2d 4:01 [62 P.2d 171], is inconsistent with
the principle that it is proper to admit evidence of previous
injuries that reasonably tends to show that the defendant
knew or should have known of the alleged dangerous condition that caused the injury in question, it is disapproved.s :

azn that cale the court upheld a ruUng sustaining the objection to
couusel's queltions .. to whether or not other women had previousl;r
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IV. Instruction on Presumption 01 Due Care
Defendant contends that since plaintiff testified fully as
io her acts and conduct in descending the stairs, the trial
court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury
on the presumption of due care. [13] Under the rule accepted by the majority of this court, the disputable presumptions (contained in Code Civ. Proc., § 1963) are evidence and
as such can be weighed. (Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585,
590·598 [128 P.2d 16] ; cf. 24 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 211, 219.)
[14] Although an instruction on the presumption of due
care may properly be given under certain circumstances (see
e.g., Westberg v. Willde, 14 Ca1.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590] ; Scott
v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313] ; Gigliotti v. Nunes,
45 Ca1.2d 85 [286 P.2d 809]), it is now settled that an instruction on the presumption should not be given when the party
who seeks to invoke it testifies concerning his conduct immediately prior to or at the time in question. (Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P. 884] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Ca1.2d 111 [47 P.2d 709] ; Mundy v. Marskall, 8 Cal.
2d 294 [65 P.2d 65] ; Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585 [128 P.2d
16] ; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742 [135
P.2d 578] ; Ringo v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 124 [221 P.2d
267] ; Jones v. Scurlock, 96 Cal.App.2d 201 [214 P.2d 599] ;
Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548 [225
P.2d 997] ; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255
P.2d 850] ; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855] ; Stout v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co.,
127 Cal.App.2d 491 [274 P.2d 194] ; Nunnemaker v. Headlee,
140 Cal.App.2d 666 [295 P.2d 438] ; Swanson v. Bogatin, 149
Ca1.App.2d 755 [308 P.2d 918] ; Hughes v. City ct Count" of
San Francisco, 158 Cal.4pp.2d 419 [822 P.2d 623].)
[16] In the present case plaintiff testified to her conduct
immediately prior to or at the time of her fall. "In the face
of this evidence there was no room for any presumption."
(Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 86, 88 [297 P.
884].) It was therefore error to give the instruction.
fallen on the atairway in question. The court held that the questions
were properly excluded, on the ground that the inquiry was not limited
to the particular atep of the atairway where the accident occurred.
The court did not diBcUIIi the possibility that, if proved, the fact that
other women had fallen on the Itairway might be relevant to the
question wbetber tbe defendant was put on notice that Bomething was
'Wrong and Bhould have inspected the Itairway to discover any defect.
'rhis evidence could be relevant whether or not the previous falls had
occurred on the Bame Itep. (See Wigmore, Evidence t 252(4).)
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[16] The question remains whether the error was prejudicial. In .Butigan v. Yellow Oab 00., 49 Ca1.2d 652, 660661 [320 P.2d 500], it is stated that:
"The determination whether, in a specific instance, the
probable effect of the instruction has been to mislead the jury,
and whether the error has been prejudicial so as to require
reversal depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the evidence, and the other instructions given. No precise formula can be drawn."
In that case, the giving of an instruction on unavoidable
accident was held to constitute reversible error because it
tended to overemphasize defendant's case. From the evidence
presented in the present case the jury could reasonably have
drawn the inference either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's
contributory negligence. The giving of the instruction obviously added strength to the plaintiff's contention that she
was acting with due care for her own safety, and thus overemphasized her claim in the minds of the jury. The de.
fendant was thereby forced to overcome by a preponderance
of the evidence, not only plaintiff's case that she was free from
contributory negligence, but also the presumption that she
was acting with due care. Instructions like the one here involved necessitated reversal in the similar cases of Rozzen v.
Bl1l'lnenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850] ; Verhaegen
v. Guy F. Atki,1son 00., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [272 P.2d 855] ;
and Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. 00., 127 Cal.App.2d 491
[274 P.2d 194], on the ground that the erroneous instruction
may. have tipped the scale in plaintiff's favor in the deliberations of the jury. It was therefore prejudicial error to give
the instruction.
The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-The question of fact with reference to the negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff were well within the province of the
jury to determine in this case. They were both decided in
favor of the plaintiff. Whether it was error to give an instruction based on the presumption provided for in subdivision 4 of Reetioll 1963 of t.be CudE' of Civil Procl'dure
allu if so whether it was reversible error uuuer the doctrine
of Mar Shee v. Maryland Assw'allce Oorp., 190 Cal. 1 [210
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P. 269], were adequately con!'iOl'rl'd b;\, thf' District Court of
Appeal of the Second Distrid, Divir.ion 1, in an opinion
written by J usHce Lillic (324 P .2d 301). The presumption
is "that a person tal.es ordinary care of his own concerns."
The Mar Shee case places certain limitations, which need
not here be disCUSSE'd, on the application of that presumption. The District Court of Appeal held that, because of the
incomplete and uncertain testimony of the 83-year-old plaintiff
.taken some four years after the accident, the limitations of
the Mar Shee case did not apply. It was also held that, considering the evidence and the instructions as a whole, there
was no reversible error. With this I agree, and adopt the
opinion of the District Court of Appeal as what I believe to be
a just and proper disposition of the appeal. I would affirm the
judgment.
I

CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shenk but
feel that the problem involved deserves further discussion.
Even assuming that instructing the jury on the presumption of due care was error in this case, it was clearly not
prejudicial.
The challenged instruction reads: "At the outset of this
trial, each party was entitled to the presumption of law that
every person takes ordinary care of his own concerns and that
he obeys the law. These presumptions are a form of prima
facie evidence and will support findings in accordance therewith, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. When there
is other evidence that conflicts with such a presumption, it
is the jury's duty to weigh that evidence against the preSumption and any evidence that may support the presumption, to
determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations,
of course, shall be related to, and in accordance with, my
instructions on the burden of proof." (Emphasis added.)
The majority holds that this 'instruction resulted in prejudice to defendant on the ground that since the evidence on
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence is susceptible
to an inferellce either way, the presumption has the effect of
"overemphasizing" plaintiff's case in the minds of the jury,
and thus it might have tipped the ,scales in plaintiff's favor.
To support its position that overempllasis is a ground for reversable error the majority relies on Butiga.n v. Yellow Cab
Co., 49 Ca1.2d 652 [320 P.2d 500]. It is submitted that this decision will not support this interpretation.
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In Butigan v. YtUoW Cab Co., aupra, 49 Cal.2d at 661, it was
held that an instruction on unavoidable accident in a close ease .
was prejudicial error, not because defendant's ease was overemphasized, but because the instruction was confusing and .
misled the jury. It is only the probable confusion of the jury
which was affirmatively demonstrated that justified our reversal. Of course, an instruction can overemphasize a party's
case, but if the jury has been otherwise properly instructed,
and there is no apparent conflict, then the error appears
cured. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Shenk, the instructions
taken as a whole were correct, and since the majority does
not claim confusion as a basis for reversal, one is ha,rd pressed
to find any prejudice.
However, a majority of this court is of the opinion that
improper "overemphasis" of a ease, without more, is grounds
for reversal whether or not the instructions are confusing or
misleading. But even accepting this proposition it can be
aftirmatively shown that the jury probably did not use the
presumption of due care to overemphasize plaintUf's ease.
Thus, a result more favorable to the appealing party would
not have been reached. Under these circumstances the application of the provisions of article VI, section 4%, of the Constitution precludes reversal. (See People v. Watson, 46 Cal.
2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].)
In establishing that the jury probably was not improperly
in1luenced one must consider the instruction on burden of
proof, the application of the presumption of due care to both
parties, and the findings for the plaintUf on both issues of
negligence and contributory negligence. Of major signiS.cance is this court's conclusion that the state of the evidence
is in near equilibrium, and that excluding the presumption,
this evidence is susceptible to inferences either way. Attention is also directed to what I consider the key factor: The
finding of the jury that defendant was negligent.
The burden of proving defendant's negligence was on the
plaintUf. Defendant, in this situation, had the benefit of the
presumption of due care. Adopting the majority's reasoning,
plaintiff was thereby forced to overcome by a preponderance
of the evidence, not only defendant's ease that it was free
from negligence, but also the presumption that it was acting
with due care. However, in the face of the burden of proof
and the presumption, the jury found on evidence in near
equilibrium, that defendant was negligent. From this flnding
it is reasonable to infer that if the jury considered the pre-
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sumption at all in regard to df'ft'ndant, its effect was negligible compared to the weight the jury gave to the testimonial,
circumstantial and real evidence. If the jury had viewed the
presumption as significant, then based on the state of the
evidence it would have found for defendant. The final inference being that the presumption prohably had no effect
upon the jury's determination regarding defendant's negligence.
Since it can be inferred that the jury did not consider the
presumption of due care in favor of defendant when considering the question of defendant's negligence, it is unreasonable
.to assume that the jury acted any differently in its notion
of the presumption when considering the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence, where the state of the evidence
On this issue was, as on the issue of negligence, in near equilibrium. One is obliged to conclude, on the assumption that a
jury will probably act consistently in the same case, that the
presumption played little or no part in the jury's determination of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Unless this court is prepared to say without any affirmative
showing, and contrary to reasonable inferences, that the jury
probably acted inconsistently, it is difficult to perceive, based
on the evidence herein, precisely how the presumption of due
care affected the result, so that without the instruction, the
result would have been altered. Indeed, where the reasonable
inference is that the jury has given little or no effect to an
erroneous instruction in considering the question of negligence, and their subsequent determination of the question of
contributory negligence is consistent with this previous inference, a proper conclusion is that the instruction did not
result in prejudice.
It is obvious that as requisites to such a conclusion the reviewing court must determine the state of the evidence' on
the issues of negligence and contributory negligenct', as well
as ascertain how the jury utilized the presumption in regard
to defendant's negligence.
For example, defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff, contending that it was prejudicial error to instruct the
jury on the presumption of due care. The reviewing court
determines that the state of the evidence on the issue of negligence was in near equilibrium but on the issue of contributory
negligence it was clear and convincing. Examining the jury's
111 C.2d-l
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actions the reviewing court Can infer that on the question
of negligence the jury probabJy disregarded the presumption
. of due care since on evidence in near equilibrium plaintiff
had to carry the burden of proof and overcome the presumption in defendant's favor, which worked to defendant's advantage in this instance. However, on the question of contributory negligence, the jury probably relied on the presumption in favor of plaintiff since this could form the only
real basis for a finding for plaintiff in the face of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. It may be reasonably
inferred, then, that the jury's actions in handling the pre'
sumption were inconsistent and resulted in prejudice.
Thus, it is the affirmative showing of the jury's inconsistency that establishes prejudice when defendant appeals.
Without such a showing there is no reason to believe the error
was probably prejudicial.
In cases where plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant on the ground that prejudicial error resulted from i
instructing the jury on the presumption of due care, it is
impossible to tell how the jury utilized the presumption. The
jury might have found the defendant nonnegligent, or the
plaintiff contributively negligent. 'Under these conditions
error is usually found on the ground that the instructions
tended to confuse or mislead the jury. (See Rozzen v. i
Blumenfeld, 117 Ca1.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850]; Stout v. '
Southern Pacific R. R. 00., 127 Cal.App.2d 491 [274 P.2d
194].) For this reason the cases cited by the majority for
the proposition that instructing the jury on the presumption
of due care constitutes prejudicial error are not in point. In
Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 285, and Stout
v. Southern Pacific B. B. 00., supra, 127 Ca1.App.2d 491,
plaintiff was appealing from a judgment for defendant. The
jury could have found for defendant on the alternative
grounds of nonnegligence or plaintiff's contributory negligence. Thus, it is impossible to draw any inference from the
jury's determination of the vital issues since we cannot be
I'crtain on which ground the jury found for defendant.
The ease of Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson 00., 126 Cal.App.
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855], involved au appeal by defendant after
a judgment for plaintiff. An attack on the instruction containing the presumption of due care was upheld. The case is
distinguishable on the ground that there, prejudice was predicated, not on the presumption of due care alone, but was the
net result of a series of erroneous instructions, of which the
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presumption of due care was only ont'o (Verlta.egen v. Guy P.
Atkinson Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at 445-447.)
There are many c·ases holding that the giving of an instruction on the presumption of due eare in favor of one party and
not the other, while erroneous, ,,,as not prejudicial. (Rogers
v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P. 884] ; Pa,ulsen
V. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111, 119 [4i P.2d 709] ; Tuttle v. Crawford, 8 Cal.2d 126, 133 [63 P.2d 1125] ; Speck v. Sarver, 20
Ca1.2d 585 [128 P.2d 16]; Scott "\'". Sheedy, 39 Cal.App.2d
96, 102 [102 P.2d 575J ; see Medeiros v. Soares, 17 Ca1.2d 176,
179 [61 P.2d 501] ; Stroh v. Ballman, 37 Ca1.App.2d 241, 245
[99 P.2d 337] ; T1tderios v. Hertz Dril'ut"self Stations, Inc.., 70
Ca1.App.2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; Mal·tindale v. Atchis01I,
T. ¢ S. F. Ry. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48J.)
Generally, it has been held to be prejudicial error for a
trial court to refuse to give such an instruction in a case
where, beeause of death or uneonseiousness, the party requesting the instruetion was unable to produce evidence as to the
happening of the accident and the issue of due care was presented. (Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540 [299
P. 529] ; Down'ing v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 246
[59 P.2d 578J; Jones v. Hei1lrich, 49 Cal.App.2d 702, 706
[122 P.2d 304J ; Maaskant v. Matsltt, 50 Cal.App.2d 819, 823825 [123 P.2d 853J ; R11ssell V. AlIclcrscn, 101 Cal.ApI).2d 684,
697-698 [226 P.2d 350] ; see Ellison v. Lang Transportation
Co., 12 Ca1.2d 355 [84 P.2d 510] ; Westberg v. Will(le, 14 Cal.
2d 360 [94 P.2d 590J ; Scott v. BIt,.ke, 39 Ca1.2d 388 [247 P.2d
313J ; Gigliotti V. NU11es, 45 Ca1.2d 85 [286 P.2d 809] ; Anderson v. County of San Joaquin, 110 Cal.App.2d 703, 716 [244
P.2d 75].) The holding in these cases is understandable when
we consider the inability of the party involved to produce any
evidenee whatsoever as to the conduct of the party in whose
favor the presumption is invoked. This is not such a case.
As pointed out hereinabove the instruction held by the
majority here to be prejudic~all~" erroneous made the presumption of due care equally applicable to both plaintiff and
delc7ldant. It should be worthy of note that tbis court has
neyer before l1eld tbe giving of such an instruction to be
prejudicial error under any circumstances. However, the
District Courts of Appeal have ruled both ways on the subject. An instruction on tIle presumption of due care identical
to the olle ]Iere was given and fonud not to be prejudicial
error in Medeiros Y. Sa(/rc.~, 17 Cal.App.2d ]7G, ]79 [61 P.2tl
501J ; Stf'oh v. Ballman, 37 Cal.App.2d 241, 244·245 I99 P.2<l
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337] ; Ttuleno. v. Hertz DrifJur.elf Station., Inc., 70 Cal.App.
2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; and MartindtJle v. Atchison T. cfp
S. F. By. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48], but a
contrary result was reached in Bozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.
App.2d 285, 287-290 [255 P.2d 850]; Verhaegen v. Guy F.
Atkimon Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442, 444-447 [272 P.2d 855];
Stout v: Southern Pacific B. B. Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491,
496-497 [274 P.2d 194] ; Nun'1lemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal.
App.2d 666, 676 [295 P.2d 438] ; and Hughes v. City cf7
County of San Francisco, 158 Cal.App.2d 419, 422-424 [322 i
P.2d 623] (see Bum. v. Churchill, 152 Cal.App.2d 491, 495496 [313 P.2d 575]).
Originally the rule appeared to be that such an instruction
was not prejudicial error because in most eases there 'Was
evidence contrary to the presumption and the courts reasoned
that the jury 'Would disregard the presumption in the face of
the contrary evidence. (Medeiro. v. Soare., supra, 17 Cal.
App.2d at 178-179.) Other eases appear to have discarded
this rationale and replaced it with the rule that whether such·
instruction is prejudicial depends upon the facts of the particular ease. This ad hoc method of deciding prejudice paved
the way for the theory adopted by the majority here. (See
Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548,
553 [225 P.2d 997] ; Bozzen v. Blurnenfeld, supra, 117 Cal.
App.2d at 288; Stout v. Southern Pacific B. B. Co., supra,
127 Cal.App.2d at 497-498; Nun'1lemaker v. Headlee, aupra,
140 Cal.App.2d at 676.) I would disapprove the last cited
eases and hold the instruction here not prejudicial.
For the foregoing reasons it seems clear that no prejudice
resulted to defendant here and the judgment should be affirmed.

